Another of the seven methods used by the Chinese Communist Party to harass CAG members abroad is systematic surveillance.
The CCP government has systematically surveilled overseas CAG communities and gathered personal data on members to fulfill its goals of transnational repression. As reported by “Bitter Winter,” an internal CCP document from February 2016, titled “Outline for Conveying the Spirit of Central Leadership Speeches and Relevant Meetings of the Central 610 Office,” revealed that then-Politburo Standing Committee member Meng Jianzhu explicitly ordered: “Give greater priority to intelligence collection on all religious groups. Increase intelligence efforts, strengthen covert deployments abroad, and improve the precision and effectiveness of suppression… Using information from overseas investigations, build a comprehensive database of individuals in overseas religious organizations to enable targeted crackdowns.”
Simultaneously, Chinese security agencies have created entities like “Overseas Police Cooperation Stations” or “Overseas Service Stations,” and deployed “covert forces abroad”—including spies, agents, and proxies—to carry out transnational repression worldwide.
(2.1) Disclosure of Personal and Church Information of CAG Asylum Seekers by the “Da Ai Wang” Website
According to the UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, the EU’s Asylum Procedures Directive, and the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the personal data of asylum seekers must be strictly safeguarded.
“Bitter Winter” reported that from May 16 to June 20, 2022, a Chinese-language website called “Da Ai Wang” published twelve sets of personal details about CAG members seeking asylum in Italy. This included their names, addresses, court case numbers, and lawsuit information, revealing private data of twenty-two individuals. The website also declared: “Our site will continue updating the list of individuals involved illegally in asylum lawsuits until they voluntarily return to China…”
The publication of subsequent batches of CAG asylum seekers’ names in Italy continues on the same website.
“Da Ai Wang” previously revealed the identities of 87 CAG members who fled to South Korea for asylum, along with internal details like CAG’s organization structure in South Korea and the names and addresses of key members in the U.S.
“Da Ai Wang” is likely directly controlled by Chinese intelligence agencies and functions as a key tool for manipulating overseas religious information warfare.
(2.2) Targeted Identification Through Media Appearances
The CCP employs facial recognition and big data analysis to identify CAG members featured in church-produced films, variety shows, and other media. Once identified, these individuals are often accused of “spreading anti-Party propaganda.” The CCP’s Ministry of Public Security runs platforms like the “China Anti-Xie-Jiao Network,” which frequently publishes lists of CAG members in the media and collaborates with international repression initiatives.
Case 1: Li Shenyan
Li Shenyan (pseudonym), her spouse, and their daughter are all CAG members. In 2014, they moved to South Korea. However, after Li and her husband made brief appearances as extras in a Christian film, authorities in China identified and targeted them. In 2017, Li’s husband traveled back to China for medical reasons and found that Li had been deprived of her job and fined over RMB 100,000 (around USD 14,000) by public security officials. Police kept interrogating him about his wife and daughter’s location overseas and subjected him to constant surveillance.
In 2022, state security officers took him from his home, using a screenshot of his appearance in the film as evidence. He was handcuffed, shackled, and forced to sit on a “tiger bench” during interrogation. Despite his history of cerebral hemorrhage, he was subjected to torture and pressed for information on the whereabouts of his wife and daughter in South Korea. In 2023, he was arrested again and has since gone missing, with his fate unknown.
Li Shenyan told “Bitter Winter,” “We’re both in our sixties. I can’t imagine the suffering my husband is going through—or even if he is still alive. All I can do is think about him. There’s nothing else I can do.”
Case 2: Li Xinyi (Taiwan)
Li Xinyi (a pseudonym), a Taiwanese citizen originally from mainland China and a CAG member, attracted the attention of the CCP authorities for participating in church-produced films.
Since 2019, CCP police have frequently visited or contacted her parents in mainland China, accusing Li of being “anti-Party and anti-government.” They used pressure and inducements, compelling her parents to pass messages demanding she returns to China and sign a statement renouncing her faith. Police claimed to have contacts in Taiwan and warned that if she refused to confess, her entire family would face consequences, including preventing her relatives’ children from education and employment.
In 2023, even as Li’s father was in the late stages of cancer, police continued to harass her family at their home. Under severe pressure, her parents often called her, urging her to comply with police demands. Fearing collective punishment, her relatives repeatedly blamed her. This pressure led Li to stop participating in church films and deterred her from visiting her ailing father in China or attending his funeral.
Case 3: Li Zhong
In 2018, Li Zhong (a pseudonym) fled to South Korea. Soon after a church-produced program featuring her was uploaded online, four police officers arrived at her parents’ house in China, claiming they were checking household registration. However, they secretly planted at least six listening devices inside her home. Later, the police took her mother to the municipal public security bureau and intimidated her by showing a photo of Li Zhong, asking her to confirm the identification. When she refused, they slammed a piece of paper on the table, claiming it was an A-level arrest warrant for her daughter. The officers pressured her to disclose Li’s South Korean address and covertly installed a listening device on her phone. After her release, Li Zhong’s mother observed suspicious vehicles and individuals monitoring her home. Police also pressured Li’s parents to travel to South Korea to locate her, promising the government would cover all expenses. Additionally, screenshots of Li Zhong from CAG films have been repeatedly posted on the Chinese “Anti-Almighty God Alliance” website.
Case 4: Jin Xin
In 2017, Jin Xin (pseudonym) escaped to South Korea. Her brief role in a church-produced film was enough to push her family into constant harassment. By September 2018, police had repeatedly questioned Jin’s mother about her daughter’s religious activities in South Korea. Soon after, a large surveillance camera was installed directly opposite their home. Her mother’s phone was monitored, and she was often followed by suspicious individuals or unmarked vehicles wherever she went. In 2020, when Jin’s grandmother became critically ill and was hospitalized in a different city, plainclothes police followed Jin’s mother as she traveled to care for her. In 2023, Jin’s father was diagnosed with cancer. Despite having medical insurance, the government blocked his medical reimbursement, and her household registration was mysteriously canceled. During her father’s funeral arrangements, multiple unmarked cars and plainclothes officers were seen surveilling their home. To this day, Jin’s mother remains under tight surveillance. Jin Xin told “Bitter Winter”: “I can’t imagine what would’ve happened if I’d gone back… I’m just a woman in my twenties, and I’ve never broken any laws. But because of my faith, they treat me like a major criminal. I couldn’t even visit my loved ones when they were sick or died. And my mother has lost her freedom because of me.”
Case 5: Xiang Guang
Persecuted for his faith, Xiang Guang (pseudonym) fled to South Korea and took part in filming gospel movies, becoming a primary target of CCP repression. In December 2018, his son and daughter-in-law were detained in China due to their faith. Although they were later released, they continued to face surveillance and harassment and were compelled to sign the “Three Statements” renouncing their faith. His son was ultimately forced to leave his home. Between 2019 and 2020, police repeatedly pressured Zhang Wenrong, Xiang’s daughter-in-law, to disclose her husband’s and father-in-law’s locations, frequently visiting their home and harassing her over the phone. The intense mental stress worsened her health, causing symptoms like persistent abdominal swelling, fever, and loss of appetite. In early 2020, she was hospitalized for ten days. Nevertheless, police continued to threaten her during and after her hospitalization via phone calls. The ongoing harassment deeply affected her health, and in May 2020, she died of liver failure at age 33.
Case 6: Tang Lu
Tang Lu (a pseudonym) appeared in several CAG films and became a target of the CCP. In July 2018, police summoned her son to investigate her religious activities abroad and her asylum request, instructing him to tell her that “if she returns to China, she must report immediately to the Public Security Bureau.” In May 2019, her son risked traveling to South Korea to warn her that security officials had her spiritual name and overseas address, and were repeatedly pressuring him to persuade her to return. He told her, “Mom, you can’t go back no matter what.” Seeing her son’s risk to his safety, Tang Lu felt heartbroken and helpless. She told “Bitter Winter,” “To avoid implicating my son, I haven’t contacted him since fleeing abroad, but the CCP still hasn’t spared him.”
Case 7: Xu Yang
Xu Yang, a pseudonym for an individual currently residing in South Korea, has appeared in various CAG films. Between 2020 and 2024, CCP authorities persistently harassed, threatened, and monitored his wife and children in China. They repeatedly demanded information about Xu’s religious practices abroad and pressured his wife to travel to South Korea to persuade him to renounce his faith and come back to China. In late 2022, Xu’s nephew was forcibly taken to a “transformation center” and went missing for several months. The case was eventually transferred to a foreign affairs division, and the family was denied access to visit him.
(2.3) Social Media Tracking and Information Gathering
Many CAG members face persecution by the CCP for sharing faith-related content on social media. In March 2025, “Bitter Winter” reported a dangerous campaign by the Chinese group “Anti-Almighty God Alliance,” which collects and publishes photos of CAG members in democratic countries. These images come from CAG videos, social media, and illegal CCP surveillance. The report states that Chinese authorities can identify asylum seekers without relying on relatives to contact the website, thanks to China’s advanced facial recognition software, which can locate all citizens. This has been confirmed by a court ruling in Freiburg, Germany, and a 2020 Italian Ministry of the Interior report, which focused on facial recognition surveillance of CAG members. The Italian report revealed that Chinese agents infiltrated public CAG events abroad, monitored websites with photos of CAG refugees, and used facial recognition technology to identify individuals depicted.
(2.4) Covert Spying and Intelligence Gathering by Suspected Agents
Case 1: Informants in Refugee Camps (Netherlands)
In 2024, a Chinese man was observed repeatedly in multiple refugee camps across the Netherlands, where he sought out and inquired about Chinese nationals, especially targeting CAG members for surveillance or contact. A dissident in one camp reported that the man once offered €150 to secretly monitor a CAG member’s roommate, requesting detailed reports on the individual’s daily activities and whereabouts. In February, he appeared at another refugee camp, proactively approaching a CAG member and attempting to gather personal information. Notably, the man used different aliases at different locations, such as “Chen XX” or “Dong XX,” raising suspicions.
Case 2: Probing CAG Members’ Information (Netherlands)
In July 2024, Xiaonian (a pseudonym), a CAG member refugee in the Netherlands, met a Chinese man at a church who introduced himself as “Chen XX” and said he was a fellow believer. The man repeatedly asked for Xiaonian’s personal details and background information during their talk. Soon after, the same person returned with two other Chinese nationals, saying, “We know there are many believers like you here.” Later, an investigation showed that “Chen” was a candidate for president of a Chinese community association linked to mainland China in the Netherlands. Besides the direct involvement of the Party-state’s security forces, many overseas Chinese organizations and United Front groups have become practical tools for Beijing’s worldwide repression.
Source: Bitter Winter
