While corruption is real, fighting it is also used as a pretext to tighten the Party’s control over the military.
On August 19, the Chinese Army newspaper published an official commentary to the new Military Regulations, emphasizing they embody the “Chinese Marxist military theory and military practice.”
In July, China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) released the new “Regulations on Vigorously Promoting Fine Traditions, Thoroughly Eliminating Toxic Influences, and Reshaping the Image and Authority of Political Cadres” (关于大力弘扬优良传统、全面肃清流毒影响 重塑政治干部形象威信的若干规定).
Following several corruption scandals that made national headlines, this revised set of military regulations underscores a significant shift in the ideological and operational framework of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). These updates, which were formally announced through official channels, reflect the Chinese leadership’s intensified focus on embedding political consciousness and loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) within the armed forces. While the problem of corruption is real, it is also used as a pretext to tighten political control over the PLA.
It is not that the PLA was ever politically independent. It has long been described not merely as a national defense force but as the armed wing of the CCP. Political work has historically been a cornerstone of military governance in China, dating back to Mao Zedong’s principle that “the Party commands the gun.” However, the 2025 revisions mark a renewed and more comprehensive effort to institutionalize political loyalty amid evolving geopolitical tensions and domestic priorities.
These regulations are part of a broader campaign to “strengthen the Party’s absolute leadership over the military,” a phrase that has become central to Xi Jinping’s military modernization and ideological consolidation efforts.
The revised regulations span multiple chapters, but several provisions stand out for their emphasis on political consciousness:
Expanded Role of Political Commissars: Political commissars are now explicitly tasked with overseeing not only ideological education but also the moral conduct and loyalty of officers and enlisted personnel. Their authority in decision-making processes has been reinforced, ensuring that political considerations are embedded in tactical and strategic operations.
Mandatory Political Study Sessions: Units must conduct regular study sessions focused on Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era. These sessions are designed to cultivate ideological alignment and reinforce the Party’s national security and development narrative.
Integration of Political Criteria in Promotions: Advancement within the PLA is now more tightly linked to political performance. Officers must demonstrate not only technical competence but also unwavering loyalty to the CCP, active participation in Party activities, and a firm grasp of Party doctrine.
Enhanced Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms: The regulations introduce stricter protocols for monitoring ideological adherence, including anonymous reporting systems and periodic evaluations. Political departments are empowered to investigate and discipline personnel who exhibit “weak political awareness” or “incorrect ideological tendencies.”
The emphasis on political consciousness is not merely symbolic—it serves strategic purposes. In the face of rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, increasing U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific, and internal challenges such as corruption and factionalism, the CCP views ideological unity as essential to maintaining control and operational effectiveness.
The Party aims to prevent dissent within the ranks by reinforcing political loyalty, ensuring cohesion during potential conflicts, and aligning military objectives with broader national goals. The regulations also reflect a belief that ideological strength can compensate for technological or logistical shortcomings in specific scenarios.
These changes will likely deepen the divide between the PLA and conventional militaries in liberal democracies, where professional autonomy and civilian oversight are emphasized. In China, the military is not a neutral institution but a political tool. The new regulations reinforce this identity, potentially affecting how the PLA interacts with foreign counterparts, engages in joint exercises, and responds to international norms.
Domestically, the regulations may also influence recruitment and retention. Candidates with strong Party credentials may be favored, while those with apolitical or reformist leanings could be sidelined.
China’s revised military regulations represent a decisive move to embed political consciousness at every level of the armed forces. By formalizing ideological education, tightening political oversight, and linking career advancement to Party loyalty, the CCP is reinforcing its control over the PLA in both peacetime and potential conflict scenarios.
This development should be viewed not only as an internal policy shift but as a signal to the international community. China’s military modernization is inseparable from its political ambitions, and understanding the PLA requires understanding the Party that commands it.
Source: Bitter Winter
